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It is the main intention of this article to de-
fend the autonomy of historical thinking as 
a basis of our work as professional histori-
ans against any attempts to prescribe his-
torical interpretations and representations 
by the force of law or by political pressure.
The presupposition of this intention is a 
clear distinction between political and judi-
cial intentions and norms, on the one hand, 
and the principles of proper historical think-
ing, which constitute historical studies as 
an academic discipline, on the other.
For every professional historian, this distinc-
tion is evident. But, unfortunately, it is not as 
clear as it seems to be at first glance. There 
are intersections between politics and law 
and historical thinking as an integral part of 
our culture. In this article, I would like to ad-
dress those principles of historical thinking 
which mediate between both sides. I think 
of fundamental principles of historical sense 
generation, which constitute the particular-
ity of history in human culture and lie be-
yond the difference between politics, law and 
academia. If they are sufficiently explicated, 
it becomes evident why historical thinking 
always is an issue of politics, so that poli-
tics cannot be kept out of the realm of our 
profession despite the logical difference be-
tween a rational argumentation in academia 
and the power games in politics.
History is a narrative answer to the ques-
tion of who the people to whom the histori-
ans belong are. Historians are specialists in 
providing a proper and convincing answer to 
this question of identity. Herein lies the cul-
tural function of their work, which, as aca-
demic professionals, they cannot abandon.










The narrative structure of historical thinking and its results in all forms of historical represen-
tation have a specific logic of making sense of the experience of the past for purposes of the 
temporal orientation in present practical life.1 The clear distinction between fact and norm, and 
empirical data and value judgments, loses its plausibility since in the procedure of telling a sto-
ry both elements are synthesised. Take the idea of value-free research: We have to realise that 
this idea can be highly misleading if it really means that historians only use neutral facts and no 
norms and values in representing the past.
Nevertheless, the idea of value-freedom2 can have an acceptable meaning if it means that histori-
cal statements have another logical form than ethical, moral or juridical statements. Additionally, it 
opens up and protects a space for rational argumentation in the field of historical culture. In doing 
so, it makes historical studies an academic discipline that is independent from any obedience to 
political and ideological prescriptions which may aim at determining the understanding of the past.
I don’t wish to go further into this issue of academic autonomy and value-freedom in the hu-
manities and social sciences.3 Instead, I want to look at principles of historical sense generation, 
which span the division of value-freedom and rational argumentation, on the one hand, and po-
litical obedience and legitimation by history, on the other. It has become a stereotype to make 
a clear distinction between the power of historical memory in the cultural life of the people and 
the academic distance from it.4 This may even reach a state of neutrality towards the needs for 
historical orientation in practical life. But this juxtaposition is misleading. A distancing, rational 
argumentation and the functioning in practical life are systematically interrelated in historical 
studies. Memory and academia share basic principles of sense generation.
I want to address these principles in the special perspective of the cultural strategies of coming 
to terms with traumatic historical experiences. For me, the paradigm of these experiences is the 
Holocaust. Nobody can deny that the Holocaust is both a subject matter of historical research 
and academic interpretation and an essential element in the historical culture of not only Jews, 
Germans and all people who were involved in this event – as victims, perpetrators, bystanders, 
profiteers, witnesses or as simple contemporaries. It has a meaning for every human being.
I would like to pick up the German case since it represents a remarkable structural change in 
historical sense generation. This change took place along the lines of the change of generations 
and of an intergenerational discourse, and it can be applied to many other cases of dealing with 
historical traumata. 
In an ideal typological manner, we can distinguish three attitudes towards the Holocaust in German 
identity formation, each of which is typical for a generation.5 I would like to characterise them in a 
very short and abstract way as the prewar, and the first and the second postwar generation. To say 
it in a very personal way: the generation of my parents, my own generation and that of my children.
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The attitude of the prewar generation can be characterised as one of concealment. The traumatic 
experience of the Holocaust could not find a place in a pregiven pattern of historical understand-
ing. This was even the case in academic discourse, where the Holocaust did not play an impor-
tant role in coming to terms with the recent past in the new field of contemporary history. The 
acceptance of responsibility for Nazi barbarism would have destroyed the established historical 
identity of this generation, which was shaped by traditional nationalism.
The second generation was deeply determined by a hidden transference of responsibility onto their 
innocent shoulders. They had to get rid of this burden and they did so through assuming a moral-
ising attitude. Historical identity was brought about by a mentality of distancing oneself from the 
previous period of German history, by condemning it and the perpetrators, by throwing it out of 
the field of (positive) sense-bearing historical experience. The postwar generation developed its 
identity through this negative judgment and the idea of a universal morality that lay behind it. (By 
the way, it was this attitude that brought about a definite end to the so-called German “Sonder-
weg” (special path to modernisation), and which has integrated the political culture of the Federal 
Republic of Germany into the western tradition of democracy based on human and civil rights.)6
This way of dealing with the Holocaust is deeply ambivalent. Historical identity always needs 
elements of the past with which the people of the present can identify. In respect to the recent 
past, there were not very many events for identification, apart from the resistance and opposi-
tion to the Nazi regime. Rather, the more sensitive and reflective people identified with the vic-
tims. This could only be done by ignoring the pregiven chain of generations, where parents grow 
into the identity of their children.
For the third generation, this breach could not be continued but had to be overcome. They had 
to reintegrate the morally guilty generation of their grandparents, and by doing so they brought 
a good deal of ambivalence into the historical culture and the collective identity of Germany. The 
most telling indication of this new relationship to the disturbing past of the Nazi period is the 
Holocaust memorial in Berlin.7 I think that my people – to date, at least – are the only ones to 
have erected a monument for their victims in the centre of their capital.
I strongly believe that the German case is not an exemption but a paradigm for a forward-looking 
European historical culture.8 It includes the criteria of a universal morality in dealing with the past by 
overcoming its fatal consequences. A moral judgment based on universal principles makes a strong 
division between innocent victims and responsible perpetrators. And this division serves as a base 
line in the identity-forming historical perspective of modern and contemporary history. The distinc-
tion between victims and perpetrators is a necessary element of historical understanding, of course. 
But when it becomes the essence of forming historical identity, it falls into the trap of ethnocentrism.
Ethnocentrism is a strategy of identity formation which inserts positive values into one’s self-im-
age and negative values into the image of the others.9 This is even the case when the sense crite-
ria of universalistic morality were used in forming one’s own historical identity. Because of logical 
reasons, this use brings about the ethnocentric imbalance between historical evaluation and judg-
ment since it makes a clear distinction between good and evil. This can easily be demonstrated by 










the attraction of victimisation in conceptualising historical identity today. There is a corresponding 
phenomenon on the other side: the growing culture of officially apologising for misdeeds of one’s 
own people in the past. (Recently the Japanese prime minister gave an official apology for the treat-
ment of the Koreans on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the annexation of Korea by Japan.) 
Victims are innocent, and the others are not. And this otherness includes not only the perpetrators.
I think the achievement of ambivalence in historical culture is a chance to overcome this moralistic 
ethnocentrism, without negating universalistic moral principles of historical evaluation and judgment.
Apologising is based on the same moral principles as the accusing of perpetrators by the offspring 
of victims. In this way, both sides share a basic values system. If apologising means that the dark 
side of one’s own history becomes integrated into the historical self-image of the people, a new 
concept of historical identity will be the outcome. Here, ways for reconciliation are opened up. But 
reconciliation needs the acceptance of the other side. And therefore a new element of historical 
culture has to be developed, namely forgiveness.10 There are only a very few examples of a histori-
cal culture of forgiving – like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa – but they do 
exist and have set new terms of trade in dealing with a burdening past.11
The moralistic attitude in historical culture finds its highly problematic equivalent in the field of 
identity politics, in the form of laws prescribing correct historical statements and attitudes. If this 
moralism becomes transformed by apologising and forgiving, identity politics will change as 
well. This change needs a common attitude towards the past in the cultural processes of identity 
formation brought about and shared by both the offspring of the victims and the perpetrators as 
well as of the other participants in the dark events of the burdening past. It must be an attitude 
that is essentially related to the realm of identity, and should spring from a mental activity which 
belongs to the essentials of human culture: We are all aware of this attitude – it is the general 
and fundamental cultural phenomenon of mourning.
The aesthetics of historical culture provide a few, but remarkable, examples of historical mourn-
ing.12 It is an open question as to what it means to introduce elements of mourning into the aca-
demic field of history. But it is evident that mourning can be a procedure in intellectual activities 
like philosophy, so why not in history?
In order to prepare academic historical discourse for the development of these new elements and 
strategies of sense generation, a change in the basic categories of historical interpretation is neces-
sary. Historical thinking is mainly interested in human activity and agency. A corresponding form of 
human life – which is as elementary and universal as agency – is suffering. This dimension of human 
life has found much less attentiveness from the historians than the “res gestae” in the human past. 
This is so evident that a theory of historical consciousness might arrive at the result that it is one of 
the main functions of historical consciousness to cover, if not to suppress, the memory of suffering.
The first attempts are already underway to represent suffering as a basic element of historical 
experience.13 But without a change in basic concepts of historical interpretation, the normal work 
of professional historians will continue to display an ignorance of suffering.
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A new awareness of the fundamental importance of human suffering in understanding history 
is required. It has to be combined with the cultural practice of mourning and forgiving and the 
new, fundamental elements of ambivalence and ambiguity in the concepts of historical identity. 
All these elements have the potential to lead to a new form of historical culture in general and 
of academic discourse in particular. I would not hesitate to characterise these forms as genu-
inely humanistic. So our academic criticism of the political misuse of historical cognition and of 
political interference should not only defend the achievements of an open, rational discourse in 
historical studies but it should be an incentive for a new humanism in history.
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